Equity Lending Practices and Home Mortgage Foreclosure in Selected Boston Inner-City Neighborhoods by Vel Ross, Julie
University of Rhode Island 
DigitalCommons@URI 
Open Access Master's Theses 
1992 
Equity Lending Practices and Home Mortgage Foreclosure in 
Selected Boston Inner-City Neighborhoods 
Julie Vel Ross 
University of Rhode Island 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.uri.edu/theses 
Recommended Citation 
Vel Ross, Julie, "Equity Lending Practices and Home Mortgage Foreclosure in Selected Boston Inner-City 
Neighborhoods" (1992). Open Access Master's Theses. Paper 753. 
https://digitalcommons.uri.edu/theses/753 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@URI. It has been accepted for inclusion 
in Open Access Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@URI. For more information, 
please contact digitalcommons@etal.uri.edu. 
EQUITY LENDING PRACTICES AND 
HOME MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE IN SELECTED 
BOSTON INNER-CITY NEIGHBORHOODS 
BY 
JULIE VEL ROSS 
A RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED IN 
PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS 
FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF 
COMMUNITY PLANNING 
UNIVERSITY OF RHODE ISLAND 
1992 
MASTER OF COMMUNITY PLANNING 
RESEARCH PROJECT 
OF 
JULIE VEL ROSS 
Approved: 
Major Professor 
Acknowledged: 
Director 
Marcia Marker Feld 
ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this research project is to examine the equity 
lending practices of unregulated mortgage companies in Boston, 
Massachusetts from 1985 to 1990. The scope of the inquiry is limited to 
the lending practices by regulated banks and unregulated mortgage 
companies in Roxbury, Dorchester and Mattapan from 1985 to 1990. The 
research is done in response to the so-called second mortgage scam that 
affected minority residents in Roxbury, Dorchester and Mattapan. 
To review these lending practices, four major questions are 
answered in this report. The questions are: 
1) What are the lending patterns of Boston's major banks in 
Roxbury, Dorchester and Mattapan? 
2) What finance structure enables unregulated mortgage companies 
to operate? 
3) Who are the unregulated lenders in violation of established 
lending standards, and in what neighborhoods do they operate? 
4) What efforts are being made at a city and state level to 
promote industry standards and prevent future foreclosures? 
The research indicates that Boston's regulated banks have redlined 
the areas of Roxbury, Dorchester and Mattapan, creating a demand for 
home mortgage and home improvement financing that was met by unregulated 
lenders. Some of the unregulated mortgage companies, particularly the 
Resource Companies, have packaged loan products that are very burdensome 
to the borrowers. The consequence to homeowners for borrowing from 
these companies was often foreclosure. 
The key findings of this report are as follows: 
• Boston's major banks have redlined Roxbury, Dorchester and 
Mattapan. 
• There was a disproportionate amount of loans contracted by 
homeowners with unregulated mortgage companies in Roxbury, 
Dorchester and Mattapan. 
• Available information on interest rates and terms of loans 
from some unregulated mortgage companies operating in 
Roxbury, Dorchester and Mattapan were usurious (in excess of 
30-percent). 
• The foreclosure rate on properties with a mortgage company 
claim was 42.2 percent. Another 27.9 percent were at risk 
of foreclosure. These figures are based on the review of 
Suffolk County Registry of Deeds records of 660 properties 
in Roxbury, Dorchester and Mattapan. 
• This practice cheats the homeowners of the equity they have 
built in their homes, and has a destabilizing effect on the 
neighborhoods. 
City officials and community leaders are seeking remedies to the 
situation. Their efforts included regulating mortgage companies in 
Massachusetts as of January 1, 1992; imposing a moratorium on 
foreclosures to provide an opportunity to review the loan agreements; 
and establishing a multi-million fund for the purposes of providing home 
mortgage and home improvement financing in Roxbury, Dorchester and 
Mattapan. 
While these remedies provide short-term solutions to the problem, 
the structure of the banking industry might promote such lending 
practices over the long-term. Long-term solutions, such as strict 
enforcement of the Community Reinvestment Act, need to be addressed to 
prevent this situation in the future. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
INTRODUCTION 
The "American dream" is synonymous with homeownership. For some, 
the expression inspires a vision of family life in the suburbs; for 
others it represents an urban lifestyle. In either case, the ability to 
purchase and maintain a home remains at the center of the ideal. 
A home represents the single largest purchase of most households 
in the United States. Few households are able to purchase a house 
without some form of long-term financing. Consequently, homeownership 
is dependent on the availability of credit. 
While regulated banking institutions are the most common resource 
for home financing, their products are not evenly distributed throughout 
all neighborhoods. Residents of inner-city neighborhoods, particularly 
those with a high percentage of minorities, often find that regulated 
banks (italicized words are defined in the glossary) do not provide 
financing in their neighborhoods. Other institutions, such as 
unregulated mortgage companies, may supply the unmet demand for 
financing opportunities, but often at a higher cost to the borrower. 
The higher cost of borrowing from mortgage companies is supposedly 
justified by the higher risk associated with inner-city housing stock 
and risk of loaning to low- and moderate-income households (Couture 
1992). The constraints imposed on regulated banks, such as disclosure 
requirements and interest rate caps, are not applicable to unregulated 
mortgage companies. 
Inherent in the unregulated environment is the potential for 
abuse. While mortgage companies provide a service to homeowners by 
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allowing access to the equity in homes, some mortgage companies have 
packaged loan products that are very burdensome to borrowers, and that 
often result in foreclosure. 
Statement of Purpose 
This research project addresses the issue of home financing 
opportunities in selected neighborhoods of Boston, Massachusetts. The 
scope of the inquiry is limited to the lending practices by regulated 
banks and unregulated mortgage companies in Roxbury, Dorchester and 
M.attapan from 1985 to 1990. The research is in response to a "second 
mortgage scam" that is alleged to be practiced by mortgage companies in 
these neighborhoods. 
Major Questions 
To review these lending practices, four major questions are 
answered in this report. The questions are: 
1) 'What are the lending patterns of Boston's major banks in 
Roxbury, Dorchester and Mattapan? 
2) 'What finance structure enables unregulated mortgage companies 
to operate? 
3) 'Who are the unregulated lenders in violation of established 
lending standards, and in what neighborhoods do they operate? 
4) 'What efforts are being made at a city and state level to 
promote industry standards and prevent future foreclosures? 
Objectives of the Research 
To begin the research, Chapter Two, Selected Neighborhood 
Characteristics, will present a brief demographic profile of Roxbury, 
Dorchester and Mattapan. The objective of the profile is to describe 
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the median income and racial mix of the neighborhoods most affected by 
mortgage company lenders. Chapter Three addresses the first major 
question by assessing lending patterns of Boston's major banks. The 
objective is to compare the lending patterns in Roxbury, Dorchester and 
Mattapan with other neighborhoods of similar socio-economic 
characteristics. Chapter Four answers the second question through a 
brief explanation of the relationship between regulated banks and 
unregulated mortgage companies. Chapter Four also answers the third 
question in that it describes the lending patterns of mortgage companies 
in Boston's selected neighborhoods, Roxbury, Dorchester and Mattapan. 
The first objective of Chapter Four is to explain the financial 
structure that enables mortgage companies to operate. The second and 
most important objective of this chapter is to analyze the loan products 
of unregulated mortgage companies, and determine the geographic 
distribution of these products. Chapter Five addresses the final 
question of local governmental attempts to seek an equitable solution to 
the problem of very burdensome loans by mortgage companies. The 
objective is to provide a sample of the legislation and programs 
introduced by Boston city officials at the time of this writing to 
remedy the situation. Chapter Six offers conclusions and 
recommendations. 
Organization 
For each chapter of this research project, the objective is 
restated, and the data sources are presented, followed by the 
methodology used to analyze the data. The major findings will conclude 
each chapter. 
lfethodology 
The methods used in this research project include a review of 
published research on redlining in Boston, Massachusetts, by the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Boston (Bradbury 1989) and the Boston Redevelopment 
Authority (Finn 1989). Mortgage company lending patterns were 
determined by a review of an unpublished research document by the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston (Munnell and Browne 1991), and other 
unpublished data. Identification of legislation and program initiatives 
directed at preventing future home foreclosures was made by a review of 
newspaper articles on the topic. The author recognized that news items 
constitute secondary data and are sometimes prone to editing and 
typographical errors. Therefore, further information on laws and 
programs was compiled and verified through telephone interviews with key 
informants. 
Data Sources 
Data used in this research project include published and 
unpublished material. Chapter Two, Selected Neighborhood 
Characteristics, is based on statistics from the U.S. Census. Chapter 
Three, Lending Practices of Boston's Major Banks, is based on data 
published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston (Bradbury 1989), and the 
Boston Redevelopment Authority (Finn 1989). These two published studies 
were based on Community Reinvestment Act and Home Mortgage Disclosure 
Act reports required of regulated banks. Chapter Four, Alternative 
Financing Opportunities: Mortgage Companies, is based on published and 
unpublished materials. Published material include essays on mortgage 
markets by Fannie Mae. Unpublished data include those gathered by the 
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Federal Reserve Bank of Boston and the Union Neighborhood Assistance 
Corp. on unregulated lenders from the Suffolk County Registry of Deeds 
records. 
BACKGROUND 
The so-called "second mortgage scam" occurred during the latter 
part of the 1980s in the neighborhoods of Roxbury, Dorchester and 
Mattapan. The lending practices of a few mortgage companies, sometimes 
working with contractors, have come under extreme criticism by community 
groups, legislators and community officials for their lending practices. 
These mortgage companies include, as this study will show, the Resource 
Companies (operating under several names, such as Resource Funding, 
Inc., Resource Lending, Inc., Resource Financial Group, Inc., Resource 
Services, Inc., and Resource Mortgage Corp), Growth Mortgage Corp., and 
Chrysler First Credit Corp. The contractors include U.S. Window Corp., 
and Vinyl Distributors of New England Inc., and others. The criticisms 
have included failing to research the borrower's ability to repay the 
debt, charging usurious interest rates, for fraud, and for violations of 
truth-in-lending laws. Many homeowners in Boston have lost their homes 
as a consequence of doing business with these companies. These mortgage 
companies are called "hardlenders" by the media and many community 
groups to differentiate them from other unregulated mortgage companies. 
The Boston media, including television and newspapers, offered 
considerable coverage of the situation during the summer of 1991 as 
victimized homeowners began to make their stories public. Neighborhood 
community organizations and city officials began to research the lending 
practices of these companies, and to hold public meetings to educate 
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low- and moderate-income families about the high risk associated with 
doing business with them. These activities encouraged more victimized 
homeowners to come forward, making it possible to learn of the lending 
patterns used by these companies and to determine the extent of their 
lending activities. 
While the initial research was made available to the public by 
community groups, city officials began to conduct educational meetings 
to inform residents of Roxbury, Dorchester and Mattapan of the names and 
practices of the hardlenders. One such meeting, sponsored by the 
Mattapan Civic Improvement Association, was held at the local police 
station on June 24, 1991. Diane Watson, Commissioner of Elderly 
Affairs, and Diane Modica, Commissioner of Consumer Affairs and 
Licensing, City of Boston, took the opportunity to expose the pattern 
used by the loan originators to obtain the borrower's signature (Modica 
1991). 
Modica reported a pattern that typically begins with a contractor 
arriving at the home, pointing out the need for repairs. This is often 
a persuasion based on fears: weak steps might cause an elderly 
individual to fall and break a hip, creating extensive medical bills. 
The contractors usually attempt to gain the trust of the homeowner by 
completing a small repair (under $500) of quality construction and on 
schedule. 
Once trust has been established, the contractor typically returns 
with a more extensive list of repairs, and many documents for the 
homeowner to sign. Included in the document package are: 1) completion 
certificates, which the homeowner signs, in advance, to authorize that 
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the work has been completed satisfactorily, and 2) loan agreements, 
often in violation of truth-in-lending laws. Modica reported that high 
pressure sales tactics are commonly used, such as the offer of 
discounted prices if the agreement is signed immediately. 
Many victims reported that papers, attached to a clipboard, 
covered what they later discovered were the interest rate and loan 
agreement section of the document. Additionally, it was reported that 
the three day right to rescind section of the contract, required by 
truth-in-lending laws, was missing or obscured. After a contract was 
signed, the contractor seldom completed the work to a satisfactory 
level. The borrower, of course, was still obligated to pay the loan. 
In a law suit filed by the Massachusetts Attorney General against 
the Resource Companies , the victimized homeowners testified that loan 
originators falsified the contracts. Borrowers were told they were 
receiving a long-term (15 year) agreement, with interest rates between 
15- and 18-percent annually. In fact, the agreements were high interest 
(20-percent or more), short-term (two years), interest-only loans, with 
balloon payments due at the end of the term. The court record states 
that loan originators often promised the borrowers that these agreements 
were only temporary and necessary to begin the home improvements, and 
that more traditional financing would be available before balloon 
payments were due. Traditional financing was not made available at a 
later date, and many homeowners found themselves in foreclosure 
procedures (Commonwealth of MA v. Resource Financial Group, Inc., 
Resource Lending, Inc., Resource Services, Inc.) 
The Worst Consequence, Foreclosure 
By law, foreclosure notices must be printed in local newspapers. 
Foreclosure notices are a source of information for other mortgage 
company loan originators. Unregulated Boston-based loan originators 
commonly used such information to solicit the affected homeowners with 
the promise of saving their homes with more financing. Typically, those 
subsequent loans were also short-term, balloon debts which allowed the 
homeowner to pay off the original debt and prevent immediate 
foreclosure, but at an increasing amount of debt. Eventually, many 
properties were sold to pay the debt. Second or third mortgage 
companies often foreclosed on properties (Marks 1992). 
SUMMARY 
Such practices have a destabilizing effect on both the affected 
households and their neighborhoods. Homeowners lose the equity built in 
their homes, which can cause financial difficulties. The homeowner is 
also forced to leave after the foreclosure. To maximize the income from 
rental properties, maintenance is reduced resulting in deterioration 
that can spread throughout the neighborhood, further destabilizing the 
community (Achtenberg and Marcuse 1986). Most of the housing units in 
Roxbury, Dorchester and Mattapan are multi-family dwellings. Review of 
the Suffolk County Registry of Deeds records indicate that many of the 
foreclosed homes were purchased by absentee landlords. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
SELECTED NEIGHBORHOOD CHARACTERISTICS 
NEIGHBORHOOD CHARACTERISTICS 
The objective of this chapter is to describe the income and 
minority population of Roxbury, Dorchester and Mattapan. This 
information is useful in determining which households are likely to be 
granted or denied credit. Selected neighborhoods in Boston are 
discussed, including the area name, planning district, median household 
income levels for 1980 and 1987, and the percent of black population. 
Data Sources 
Sources of statistical information on neighborhood characteristics 
include census data and statistics compiled by the Boston Redevelopment 
Authority (BRA). Geographic units of analysis include planning 
districts, defined by the BRA; census tracts; and neighborhood 
statistical areas (NSAs). NSAs are used in this discussion. Planning 
districts are used only to identify the respective communities. 
Neighborhoods, Median Incomes, and Populations 
The following list includes information regarding the 
neighborhoods most affected by the hardlenders: 
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leigbborhood/ 
Planning District 
Dudley, Brunswick ling/ 
Ro1bury 
Ash1ont/So . Dorchester 
Bowdoin I., tit . Bowdoin/ 
So. Dorchester 
Cod1an Sq., ! We Can, E. 
Cod1an Bl/So. Dor. 
E.Lower Mills, Cedar Grove/ 
So. Dorchester 
Fields Corner East/So.Dor. 
Fields Corner West/So.Dor. 
Meeting House Hill/So . Dor. 
leponset, Port lorfolk/ 
So. Dorchester 
St. Marks/So. Dorchester 
W.We Can, W.Cod1an Bl., 
W.Lower Mills/ 
Matt a pan 
Franklin Field lorth/ 
Roxbury 
Franklin Field South/ 
Mattapan 
Eggleston Sq./Roxbury 
Southern Mattapan/Mattapan 
Wellington Hill/Mattapan 
Highland Part/Roxbury 
Lower Roxbury/Roxbury 
Savin-Moreland/Roxbury 
Washington Park/Roxbury 
1980 
Median 
Household 
Income 
$ 9,669 
17,137 
8,868 
11, 360 
14,303 
ll, 238 
14,336 
11,795 
16,368 
14,429 
14,621 
10,112 
9,608 
9,690 
16 , 183 
12,849 
8,965 
6,401 
10,625 
9,582 
1987 
Median 
Household 
Income 
$16,649 
28,621 
15,858 
19,420 
34,211 
24,394 
24,730 
24,037 
32, 727 
31,668 
31,936 
17,048 
15,290 
18,200 
22,073 
23,932 
17,623 
45,352 
19,187 
20,087 
1980 
Percent 
Population 
Black 
67.1 
6.5 
63.0 
77.0 
. 7 
1.4 
52.5 
20.8 
.7 
8.1 
59.4 
94.4 
90.5 
31.0 
76.1 
91.8 
76.0 
84.7 
85.0 
91.1 
1980 
Population 
12,033 
6,883 
4,921 
9,884 
5,679 
2, 111 
5,881 
6,803 
8,317 
8,644 
5,951 
6,859 
10,362 
6,505 
12,008 
7,506 
3,252 
4,494 
6,099 
18,550 
The median household income throughout the city of Boston in 1987 
was $32,980 (Apgar 1991). The statistics indicate that many of the 
households of Roxbury, Dorchester and Mattapan are below the median 
household income for the city . Most would not qualify for mortgages 
under traditional lending guidelines. 
The statistics suggest, however, that median incomes in a few 
neighborhoods might be sufficient to qualify for mortgages or home 
improvement loans under the traditional standard . Of course, loan 
approval should be based on individual income and total household debt. 
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Still, it appears that some households would qualify for traditional 
lending opportunities. 
SUMMARY OF NEIGHBORHOOD CHARACTERISTICS 
The objective of this chapter was to present selected neighborhood 
characteristics of Roxbury, Dorchester and Mattapan, including median 
household income levels and the percentage of minorities. The data 
suggest that many households would have difficulty in carrying debt, as 
incomes are below the median income level. There are several 
neighborhoods, however, with residents earning enough income that some 
would probably qualify for traditional financing opportunities. 
CHAPTER THREE 
LENDING PRACTICES OF 
BOSTON'S MAJOR BANKS 
BANKING PRACTICES: REDLINING IN BOSTON 
INTRODUCTION 
Deregulation of the banking industry has bad broad effects across 
the housing market, particularly in New England. Speculative 
investments in condominiums, commercial real estate, and much of the 
single family housing stock in urban areas has weakened the solvency of 
many financial institutions, resulting in less mortgage credit 
availability throughout the industry. The credit crunch that affects 
the housing market for many low-income, minority New Englanders today, 
however, is the continuation of a long-standing trend of disinvestment 
in certain socio-economic neighborhoods. 
This chapter examines the practice of redlining in Boston, and 
addresses the first major question of the research: what are the 
lending practices of Boston's major banks? The first section, 
Redlining, defines redlining, and the predictable stages of neighborhood 
transition. The second section, Evidence of Redlining in Boston, 
reviews some of the fundamental causes of bank lending restrictions in 
inner-city neighborhoods (the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Study). 
This is followed by a review of the effects of redlining on lower socio-
economic neighborhoods of Boston (the Finn Study). 
Section One, Redlining 
The Prevalence of Redlining Over Time 
Redlining is defined as the failure of financial institutions to 
provide loans in certain neighborhoods for buying and fixing houses 
(Stone 1986). While federal legislation, such as the 1977 Community 
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Reinvestment Act, has attempted to discourage this practice, it 
continues as it has for some time. 
During the 1950s, FHA and VA guidelines served to constrict the 
consideration of applications for mortgage financing from integrated or 
minority areas. This practice had the effect of redlining large areas 
of urban development (Citizens Commission of Civil Rights 1986). While 
these institutions have changed their policies, similar effects result 
from other practices throughout the industry. The Federal National 
Mortgage Association (FNMA), the Government National Mortgage 
Association (GNMA), and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation 
(Freddie Mac) have established strict underwriting standards based on 
suburban single family development, which continues to leave inner-city 
neighborhoods at a mortgage credit disadvantage (Ferguson 1991). 
In 1971, the National Urban League conducted a study of housing 
decay and abandonment in seven major cities throughout the United 
States. The study concludes that redlining was prevalent in urban areas 
throughout the country at that time (Listokin 1980). 
More recently, two studies have been conducted in Boston to assess 
lending opportunities in minority neighborhoods. Both studies have 
determined that redlining, despite the housing boom of the 1980s, is 
still a common occurrence (Bradbury 1989) (Finn 1989). 
The Transition of Neighborhoods 
Neoclassical economic theory suggests that housing filters down. 
Consumer choice is the motivating factor behind the deterioration of 
neighborhoods. The theory sees the change as a series of inevitable, 
"natural" events. It assumes that individual choices to move trigger 
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decline and abandonment, and that banks react to, rather than encourage 
the neighborhood change process. Investors purchase housing after 
families move out, and reduce maintenance on the building to enhance 
profits. The next phase in the process is redlining by financial 
institutions (Meyerson 1986a). 
This theory is founded on demand-side, rather than supply-side 
economics. It fails to acknowledge the role of banking policies, 
particularly in inner-city neighborhoods, that influence household 
preferences (Meyerson 1986a). 
The Urban League research revealed a predictable pattern of stages 
in the deterioration of urban neighborhoods. The first evidence of 
change in a neighborhood, according to the study, is a difference in 
socio-economic status. The second stage is a change in the racial 
character of the neighborhood, with whites leaving and blacks entering. 
The third stage shows evidence of property speculation and exploitation, 
followed by deterioration of market conditions and disinvestment by both 
the financial institutions and the property owners who stop maintaining 
the property. The final stage in the process is abandonment (Listokin 
1980). 
Fundamental Causes of Housing Deterioration 
The primary cause of housing problems in the United States is that 
housing is motivated by profit. Inner-city absentee landlords invest 
the least amount of maintenance costs to maximize profits on the 
investment. This practice ensures that housing conditions will 
deteriorate. Homeowners within the same neighborhood are affected by 
the practice as well. Mortgage lending institutions are likely to 
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consider these neighborhoods "high-risk" and restrict credit to the 
area. Although poverty is a factor that must be analyzed in lending 
practices, the area-wide credit restrictions serve to prohibit access to 
mortgage funds for those households with the ability to repay their 
debts (Achtenberg and Marcuse 1986). 
That housing is not considered a right is reflected in the lack of 
a comprehensive federal policy to ensure a safe shelter . Federal 
policies and programs have been compromised to special interests, 
resulting in a series of schemes that, for lack of permanent investment, 
have been almost guaranteed to fail (Achtenberg and Marcuse 1986). 
Deregulation of the banking industry has the effect of 
consolidating banking activities into huge, multinational financial 
institutions. Big bank mergers result in the need to cut expenses, 
often achieved by closing down branches. This practice causes 
inconvenience to individuals in the affected neighborhoods and can 
reduce available funds for mortgage lending (Meyerson 1986b). 
Additionally, decisions to offer construction and mortgage loans 
are often made on real or perceived expectations of risk. Accordingly, 
banks create a self-fulfilling prophecy when they restrict credit in a 
particular neighborhood. Even during periods of economic activity, 
these areas deteriorate (Finn 1989). 
Boston's inner-city neighborhoods, particularly Roxbury, 
Dorchester and Mattapan, have felt the effects of redlining. This is 
due, in part, to the economic boom of the 1980s. Some areas of the city 
were selected for redevelopment and gentrification, such as the South 
End, Bay Village and Chinatown. Many households that were dislocated in 
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this process have moved to Dorchester and Roxbury because the rent costs 
were relatively less expensive. An increase in the Asian population in 
Roxbury from 1.9 percent in 1980 to 3.8 percent 1990 is evidence of this 
change (U.S.Census of the Population, 1980 and 1990). 
Gentrification was actively promoted by the actions of city 
government. It channelled federal funds into upscale areas, offered tax 
breaks and/or public land to developers, and restricted the activities 
of community development corporations to less desirable areas (McAfee 
1986). Although gentrification did not occur in all neighborhoods, it 
had the effect of increasing housing costs, including rent, throughout 
the city. One effect of gentrification was the increase in condominium 
conversions. Over 20,000 rental units throughout the city were 
converted, reducing the supply of rental units and increasing the cost 
of the remaining rental units. By 1988, Boston had become the fourth 
least affordable housing market in the country (Finn 1989). 
The recent downturn of the economy forced the city to cut back on 
many social services, including schools, health centers, and bus routes 
(McAfee 1986). Economic forces have an effect on private enterprise as 
well, particularly in the banking industry. The effects of the 
recession of the early 1990s is most evident in the minority 
neighborhoods of the city. 
Section Two, Evidence of Redlining in Boston 
An underlying assumption in this research is that if traditional 
mortgage and home improvement funds are available to minorities, the 
need to seek alternative financing is unnecessary. Therefore, an 
investigation of traditional sources of financing is appropriate. 
The Federal Reserve Bank and The Boston Redevelopment Authority Studies 
A thorough examination of traditional lending opportunities 
offered by banks throughout the city of Boston was completed in two 
studies released in 1989. The first was produced by the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Boston, and written by Katharine Bradbury and others. The 
second was conducted by Charles Finn and commissioned by the Boston 
Redevelopment Authority. 
Both studies utilized Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) reports. 
Neighborhood statistical areas (NSAs) defined by the Census Bureau and 
the Boston Redevelopment Authority were used to examine banking 
activities at a neighborhood level. Both studies used Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act (HMDA) reports as a source of primary data, in addition 
to data on mortgages maintained by the Suffolk County Registry of Deeds 
and published by Banker & Tradesman, a weekly publication offering 
specific information on real estate and banking matters. In addition, 
the Finn study used Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency (MHFA) data on 
loans applied to the area NSAs (Bradbury 1989) (Finn 1989). 
Bank lending practices in the city are summarized in Table 3.1 
(page 20). Banks are ranked according to levels of banking activity 
from the largest banks (with more than one billion dollars in deposits), 
to the smaller banks (those with deposits of less than one billion 
dollars.) Clearly, the majority of banks in the city are not investing 
in the minority neighborhoods, as indicated by the white/minority 
lending ratios. 
Some of the institutions listed in the table have gone out of 
business since 1989. These include First American Bank and Eliot 
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Table 3.1 MORTGAGE LENDING BY BOSTON'S BANKS, 1981-1987 
VUte/lilorit7 
leig•hrhod 
laat latio 
First lat'l Bant of Boston 2.1:1 
Bant of lew England 1.9: 1 
State Street 8ant t 
Sbawaut Bant 2. 3: 1 
Boston Five 0.9:1 
The Provident 4.2:1 
RoaeOwners ILKI 
U.S. Trust Coapany 1.6: 1 
South Boston Savings 7.4:1 
leWorld Bant for Savings 1.9 :1 
first llutual of Boston 2.5:1 
Baybant of Boston, 
Harvard Trust and 
lorfolt 11.7:1 
first Aaerican Bant 0.6:1 
Capitol Bank and Trust 10.2:1 
Rayaartet Cooperative ILlll 
Boston Trade Bant t 
Eliot Savings Bant 1.5: 1 
East Boston Savings Bant 43.3:1 
Olyapic International t 
Wortingaen's Cooperative 3.6:1 
Overall ratio (all banks) 2.9:1 
t lade too few tortg1ges to calc1late a r1tio 
RD: lo 10rtgage lom ii 1horit7 aeigHorhoh 
htio hcldhg 
'°''t 'uraated 
Loaas 
2.1:1 
2.6:1 
t 
12.0:1 
0.9:1 
8.0:1 
ILKI 
1. 8: 1 
7.6:1 
2. 0: 1 
2.4:1 
11.7:1 
0.7:1 
10. 2: 1 
ILKI 
t 
2.0:1 
42.8:1 
t 
3.5:1 
3.4:1 
So1rces: lecisioa lese1rc• Scieaces, lac. 11i lome lortgage Disclos1re .ltt, (Fi11 1989) 
Total leposit& 
(Milliou, 
l-1illions) 
$7.4828 
$6.0298 
$3.9838 
$3.131B 
$1.4668 
$1.1468 
$1.1068 
$888.89111 
$766.18511 
$764.81611 
$563.69611 
$433. 23011 
$355.45111 
$328.71811 
$325.60611 
$246.61111 
$228.32011 
$217.65111 
$179.48011 
$176.21111 
Savings Bank. The Bank of New England has since been purchased by the 
Fleet/Norstar Group. 
The Federal Reserve Bank Study 
The authors of the Federal Reserve Bank study assert that Roxbury, 
Mattapan and parts of Dorchester are not receiving a fair share of 
financing opportunities. Various non-racial factors are included in the 
analysis, including adjustments for less wealth, lower incomes, lower-
valued housing, and less housing development. Such adjustments reduce 
the size of the discrepancy in lending by race, but there remains a 24 
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percent difference in lending practices between neighborhoods with 
predominately white populations and predominately black populations 
(Bradbury 1989:4). 
The authors of the Federal Reserve Bank study investigated the 
financial sources for real estate transactions by type of lender between 
1982 and 1987. The sources of data included the file of individual deed 
transfers maintained by the Suffolk County Registry of Deeds. Because 
this file contained commercial and industrial transactions as well as 
residential sales, an adjustment was completed to more accurately 
reflect residential sales activities throughout the city. The findings 
of the city-wide analysis indicate that nearly 60 percent of all 
transactions in Boston during this period were financed by banks, 
thrifts and their affiliated unregulated mortgage companies. An 
additional 15 percent were financed by unregulated mortgage companies 
not affiliated with commercial banks or thrifts. Other private lenders, 
including credit unions, sellers, real estate trusts, pension funds and 
others, accounted for 6.5 percent. 19 percent of the transactions were 
shown to have no mortgage financing (Bradbury 1989:5-10). 
Further analysis of real estate transactions and mortgages were 
completed for the years 1982 through 1987 to examine the racial 
integration of the neighborhoods. Neighborhoods were categorized on the 
basis of racial composition, ranging from those with nearly all white 
populations to neighborhoods whose populations were largely black. The 
neighborhood boundaries are those defined by NSA criteria, and included 
populations which were composed of, roughly: 
a) less than 5 percent black residents, 
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b) between 5 and 20 percent black residents, 
c) between 20 and 50 percent black residents, 
d) 50 and 80 percent black residents, 
e) more than 80 percent black residents. 
For purposes of the Federal Reserve Bank study, Asians and other 
minority groups were included as white. 
The results of the analysis indicate a very different pattern of 
lending in neighborhoods with a majority white population as compared to 
neighborhoods with a majority black population. In neighborhoods with a 
majority white population, about 8.6 percent annually of all properties 
were sold between 1982 and 1987, with an annual average of 6.9 percent 
of the properties accepted for traditional mortgage financing. In the 
neighborhoods with a majority black population, 5.2 percent of the 
properties sold, with 3.5 percent receiving bank financing (Bradbury 
1989:12-13). 
In neighborhoods less integrated, the differences are even 
greater . Bradbury reports: 
"In neighborhoods with populations that were less than 5 percent 
black, mortgages were originated on an average of 6.8 percent of 
structures in an average year. In neighborhoods with populations 
that were more than 80 percent black, mortgages were originated on 
only 2.7 percent of structures in an average year" (Bradbury 
1989:13). 
The number of transactions is dependent on both the supply of and 
demand for housing. New construction and the number of condominium 
conversions affect the supply, and periods of increased activity, such 
as the 1980s, can create increased mortgage lending activity in one area 
over another. Housing demand is affected by household earnings, age, 
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family size and composition, and other factors. The study controlled 
for these variables, as well as the fact that the majority of the 
population in Boston was white and that whites might have been reluctant 
to move into black areas. This served to reduce the pool of potential 
buyers in black areas. It was determined that white householders were 
more mobile than their black counterparts, and that blacks had less 
opportunities for the sale or purchase of homes (Bradbury 1989:16). 
Other variables used in the study to explain the difference in 
lending, by race, include the percent of black residents, the percent of 
other minorities, income, wealth, median value of single-family owner-
occupied housing, rent, vacancy rate, commercial and industrial 
property, mobility, age, housing development, depository institution 
offices and economic conditions over time. Raw data utilized before the 
regression analysis indicates that there was a 60 percent difference in 
the number of transactions in neighborhoods with black and white 
populations. This figure is adjusted to allow for the variables. 
Nonetheless, neighborhoods with largely black populations receive 24 
percent fewer mortgage transactions than neighborhoods composed of 
mostly white residents after adjustment (Bradbury 1986:18-21). 
Transactions with no recorded mortgages were also examined. This 
type of housing transaction accounts for approximately one-fifth of the 
sales between 1982 and 1987. There is a noticeable variation of 
percentages of transactions with no recorded mortgages across the 
neighborhoods. While these transactions accounted for less than 20 
percent of the total sales in neighborhoods with a majority of white 
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residents, over 40 percent of the structures sold in neighborhoods with 
more than 50 percent black residents were unfinanced (Bradbury 1989:21). 
According to the Bradbury study, it is clear that banks and 
thrifts are not lending unilaterally throughout Boston's neighborhoods. 
Race has been determined to be a principal factor in determining the 
desirability of lending in the area. 
The Finn Study 
The Finn study was published subsequent to the Federal Reserve 
Bank report. Finn used a different approach in his research. Rather 
than stressing neighborhood characteristics as causes of lending trends, 
Finn interpreted these variables as influenced by lending practices. 
The focus of this section, then, is on the demand for mortgage financing 
as an explanation for bank lending practices (Finn 1989:4). 
I Finn concluded that the economic boom of the 1980s has put the 
rate of homeownership for blacks well below the rate for whites. In 
fact, homeownership opportunities for blacks in Boston ranked last of 48 
metropolitan areas in 1980. The rate of homeownership for black 
Bostonians was 41.3 percent, while the average of the 48 metropolitan 
areas was 66.5 percent (Finn 1989:7). Additionally, the ratio of 
mortgage loans per 1,000 units was 2.9 in neighborhoods with a majority 
white population to 1 in neighborhoods with a majority black population 
between 1981 and 1987 (Finn 1989:ii). 
The Community Reinvestment Act requires banks to provide mortgage 
funds to all neighborhoods, while maintaining sound banking practices. 
The ability to repay debt is, of course, dependent on income. 
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Therefore, it might be assumed that variations in lending practices 
would be based on income. However, this is not the case. 
Finn categorized neighborhoods and census tracts into groups of 
income "deciles", a category which reflects income based on 10 percent 
of the census tract or neighborhoods. Three income categories were 
utilized: 
"(1) the first through third deciles (median family incomes below 
$28,805 in 1987); (2) the fourth through sixth deciles (median 
family incomes between $28,805 and $46,455; and (3) the seventh 
through tenth deciles (median family incomes above $46,455)" (Finn 
1989:15). 
Application of these categories to mortgage loans made per 1,000 
units revealed that the lowest income category received 67 loans, while 
the middle income category received 53 loans, and the highest income 
category received 85 loans per 1,000 units (Finn 1989:15). 
Finn determined a significant difference, however, in the levels 
of financing between neighborhoods of the same income but with different 
racial characteristics. The Dudley, Brunswick King section of Roxbury, 
for example, a neighborhood with a 67.1 percent black population, 
received 17 loans per 1,000 units, while the West Fens neighborhood, an 
area with an 8.4 percent black population, received 192 loans per 1,000 
units (Finn 1989:15). In the planning districts (a larger unit of 
measure than neighborhoods) of Roxbury and Mattapan, only 33 and 35 
mortgage loans per 1,000 units were found. Similar planning districts 
with a majority white population showed a range of loans, from 47 to 148 
(Finn 1989:21). 
The Finn study includes analysis of home improvement lending not 
analyzed by the Federal Reserve Bank research. The pattern Finn 
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described for home improvement lending is opposite that of mortgage 
lending, "banks actually provided more home improvement loans per 1,000 
units in Boston's minority census tracts than they did in white census 
tracts with comparable incomes" (Finn 1989:27). The ratio of home 
improvement loans to black residents, by census tract, was .55:1, a 
trend that held in all income deciles. This may be interpreted as 
acknowledgement by banks of creditworthy individuals living in minority 
neighborhoods. The type of loan, of course, is different. Home 
improvement loans are typically higher-interest, shorter-term debts than 
mortgage loans. The increased activity may reflect the increasing value 
of these homes, and the suitability of the structures for future sale 
and mortgage financing (Finn 1989:27-29). 
The Effects of Redlining 
While there are many personal stories of hardship as a result of 
redlining, the effects spread throughout the entire community. 
Neighborhoods begin to deteriorate without a steady flow of funds, and 
during periods of economic growth, disinvested neighborhoods suffer in 
even greater proportions (Finn 1989). 
Regulated lenders have put considerable investments into 
condominiums, especially in lower - income neighborhoods with largely 
majority white populations. The effect of this practice is to reduce 
the supply of affordable rental units. This, in turn, can affect the 
economic development of the area. Many of the job opportunities 
expected to increase in the near future are service-oriented jobs. 
Traditionally, this type of employment pays less than manufacturing 
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jobs. High rent costs can reduce the available labor pool, and stifle 
economic growth over the long run (Finn 1989). 
SUMMARY 
The objective of this chapter was to answer the question, what are 
the lending practices of Boston's major banks? Studies completed by the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston and Charles Finn provide evidence that 
redlining, especially for home mortgages, has occurred in minority 
neighborhoods throughout the city. Even with income adjustments , the 
city-wide ratio of lending in white and black borrowers is 2.9:1. In 
other words, white borrowers are nearly three times as likely to receive 
loans than are black borrowers. Some neighborhoods have experienced a 
ratio higher than the city average. 
Although home mortgages are not readily available in minority 
areas, home improvement loans by banks show the reverse trend. The high 
level of activity in minority neighborhoods by unregulated mortgage 
companies for home improvements may be a result of real or perceived 
discrimination by banks. 
It is evident that Boston's banks are not meeting their Community 
Reinvestment Act (CRA) requirements . The CRA requires that regulated 
banks develop products that meet the needs of the community they serve, 
including low- and moderate-income areas. Banks have a positive 
obligation to market and advertise "programs for lending products and 
services that are responsive to the needs of the community and that will 
inform and stimulate awareness of those products and services throughout 
the community, including low- and moderate-income areas" (Federal 
Reserve Board, Comptroller of the Currency, et al, 1989:6). Such a 
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statement can be interpreted as awareness of the impact of a negative 
perception. 
The following section of this report, Chapter Four, will examine 
the lending practices of mortgage companies throughout the city. For 
minority neighborhoods, this resource appears to be a major opportunity 
for financing not afforded by banks. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
ALTERNATIVE FINANCING OPPORTUNITIES: 
MORTGAGE COMPANIES 
MORTGAGE COMPANY PRACTICES IN BOSTON 
The preceding chapter reviewed redlining in Boston and the extent 
of mortgage lending by regulated banks in neighborhoods with a majority 
white population and those with minority populations. It is clear that 
Roxbury, Dorchester and Mattapan have been redlined. Even though banks 
offer home improvement loans at a higher ratio to black neighborhood 
residents over white neighborhood residents, it is likely that black 
residents perceive that they have little or no access to traditional 
sources of financing. 
The failure of Boston's banks to make loans in minority 
neighborhoods creates a demand for financing that is being met by non-
traditional institutions, including mortgage companies. Mortgage 
companies are defined in this context as those lending companies which 
are not regulated by the Federal Reserve Board, Comptroller of the 
Currency, and other government regulatory agencies. The mortgage 
companies that are analyzed in this project are those that provide loans 
to borrowers through a line of credit established by the mortgage 
companies from regulated banks. 
This chapter describes the lending patterns of mortgage companies 
operating in the city of Boston. The second and third major questions 
presented for analysis are addressed: What finance structure enables 
unregulated mortgage companies to operate? and, Who are the unregulated 
lenders in violation of established lending standards and in what 
neighborhoods do they operate? 
Mortgage companies, until recently, operated in an unregulated 
environment in Massachusetts. Although they offer loans in a manner 
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similar to banks, albeit at generally higher interest rates, they do not 
collect deposits to replenish their funds as banks do. A discussion of 
the relationship of mortgage companies with banks to replenish mortgage 
funds will be offered. This discussion is followed by the analysis of 
mortgage company lending patterns in Roxbury, Dorchester and Mattapan. 
The Role of Mortgage Companies Within the Mortgage Finance System 
Deregulation of the banking industry has served to promote 
fundamental changes with regard to mortgage financing. The supply of 
mortgage funds is no longer strictly within the domain of savings and 
loans, as had been the case under the constraints of New Deal 
legislation before banking deregulation (Florida 1986) (Olson 1990). 
Other types of regulated banks, such as commercial banks, national 
banks, or state chartered banks, have attempted to increase their share 
of mortgage loans. One method of increasing the share of mortgage 
financing is through mortgage banking firms (Olson 1990). 
Mortgage companies often operate in an unregulated market 
unrestricted by federal or state mandates such as CRA or Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act (HMDA) guidelines. Nor do government safeguards apply to 
mortgage companies, such as the QTL requirement (Regulation Q) that 70 
percent of savings and loans assets be invested in residential mortgages 
(Olson 1990). 
Mortgage companies put their energies into marketing their 
products. Because they are non-depository institutions, all the loans 
they originate must be sold either to a bank or, if the mortgage 
companies are large enough, directly into the secondary mortgage market. 
Very few mortgage companies, however, are large enough to remain 
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independent of banks. Kost operate under a line of credit extended by 
banks (Rose and Hanley 1990). 
This relationship works well for major banks. One result of 
deregulation has been the consolidation of banks, with the larger 
institutions purchasing their smaller competitors. Such purchases, of 
course, draw on the larger banks' resources, so to strengthen their 
reserves, the banks will attempt to reduce their costs of doing 
business. One successful method is to have mortgage brokers originate 
and service loans. Banks purchase the loans from the mortgage companies 
and, in turn, sell those mortgages that meet the criteria of the 
secondary mortgage market (Olson 1990). 
This method eliminates the need for banks to hire personnel to 
originate and service loans, and also relieves them of constraints 
imposed be federal or state mandates, such as upper limits on interest 
charges, or regulatory disclosure requirements. The practice also 
relieves the banks of any responsibility for loans that might be 
questionable in terms of interest rates or closing costs and insulates 
them from public criticism when irregular lending practices are exposed 
(Canellos 1991). 
Of the top 300 mortgage companies in the United States, most are 
owned by banks. In fact, of the top 100 mortgage companies, only nine 
are independent (American Banker 1989). The top ten independent 
mortgage companies are listed in Table 4.1 (page 34). The ranking is 
determined by servicing portfolios as of 1988. 
The mortgage company that ranked number one, Lomas and Nettleton, 
incidently, has filed for bankruptcy (Olson 1990). This might suggest 
that the long-term success 
of mortgage companies will 
be determined by their 
relationship with the 
banking industry (Olson 
1990). 
Wholesale mortgage 
bank activity has been 
increasing in recent years. 
The opportunity to assume 
the role held by savings and 
loan institutions before 
Table 4 .1 TOP TEN INDEPENDENT MORTGAGE 
COMPANIES, 1988 
Rank Along All 
Fir1 !lorhage Couanies 
1. Lo1as Financial Corp. 4 
2. I1co Realty Service 26 
3. Waterfield !lortgage 31 
4. Donan & Wilson 53 
5. lational !lortgage Co. 63 
6. Tork Associates 73 
7. Co11onvealtb !lortgage 80 
8. Colonial Mortgage 89 
9. Guild Mortgage 96 
10. Loan Alerican 98 
Some: htricn laabr (1989) 1 fro1 D ..l. Oboa's article h 
Jnraal of lmhg lmmk (1990) 
banking regulation has proven to be profitable. In periods of decline, 
the wholesale banks can simply reduce the number of mortgage purchases 
from brokers rather than reduce personnel or close branch offices. The 
top 58 largest wholesale mortgage banks volume purchases nationally rose 
from $28.5 billion in 1988 to $50.9 billion in 1989, and was expected to 
reach $60 billion in 1990 (Olson 1990). 
Banks that have extended lines of credit to mortgage companies 
operating in Boston are listed in Table 4.2 (page 35). Of the 
affiliated banks listed in the local list, Fleet Mortgage/Real Estate 
Funding was ranked number one in the nation's top ten wholesale mortgage 
banks in 1990, with planned purchases of $7,300,000,000 (Olson 1990). 
This evidence suggests that recent activity in mortgage lending is 
for larger banks to establish wholesale mortgage banks to do business 
with mortgage brokers (Olson 1990). 
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Table 4.2 LOCAL MORTGAGE COMPANIES AND THEIR BANK 
AFFILIATES, 1990 
Kortgage Co1panies 
Chrysler First 
First Co11onvealth Financial 
Leader Kortgage 
Koney Store 
lew England Financial 
Consultants 
lortheastern Kortgage 
Resource Equity 
Resource Financial Corp. 
Resource Lending of l.B. 
Resource lortheast Inc. 
Sterling Kortgage Co. 
Sun Financial Group Inc. 
The Resource Group Inc. 
Bank Affiliates 
Ci ti corp 
Rockland Trust Co. 
Bank Five for Savings 
lev Jersey Bank IA 
Horizon Bank IA 
!1erican lat'l Bank 
Saugus Bank & Trust Co. 
Lynn Five & Colonial Bank 
First Colonial Bank for Savings 
First lat'l Bank of 
Louisville 
First Colonial Bank of 
Louisville 
First lat'l Bank of Boston 
Banc Boston Leasing Inc. 
Bank Five for Savings 
Lincoln Trust Co. 
Fleet lat 'l Bank 
Fleet lat'l Bank 
Fleet lat 'l Bank 
Worcester County Inst. for 
Savings 
Baybank Kiddlesex 
Bank of lev England (nov 
Fleet) Worcester County 
laples Federal S & L Assoc. 
Fleet lat' l Bank 
Source: Unifor1 Co11ercial Code, 1991 
Hortgage Company Lending Practices in Boston 
This section of the chapter on lending reviews the loan patterns 
of unregulated mortgage companies in Boston, Massachusetts. The general 
pattern of such activities is provided by unpublished research compiled 
by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. The general nature of this 
analysis, however, fails to completely assess the impact of unregulated 
mortgage company practices in minority neighborhoods. Therefore, for 
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purposes of this study, these data were supplemented by unpublished data 
compiled by Union Neighborhood Assistance Corporation and were analyzed 
by this author. 
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK STUDY OF HORTGAGE COHPANY LENDING PRACTICES 
Data Sources and Kethodology 
In response to the media coverage of the so-called second mortgage 
scam, the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston conducted research to document 
the total number of high-rate loans secured by real estate in Suffolk 
County (95 percent of which is Boston). The focus of their research was 
on non-acquisition loans, meaning that no deed was transferred. These 
included second mortgage loans, first mortgages, and refinancing first 
mortgages (Munnell and Browne 1991). 
The initial examination of mortgage company lending patterns 
presented in this chapter is based on the Federal Reserve study. The 
Federal Reserve research analyzed the number of high-rate loans 
originated by mortgage companies in Boston and compared that to the 
number of loans originated in Roxbury and Mattapan from 1987 to 1990. 
Data collection by the Federal Reserve researchers began with a 
review of Banker and Tradesman, a Boston publication that provides the 
name of the borrower, the property address, the lender and the amount of 
the loan. Terms of maturity and some interest rate information, not 
available from this source, were available at the Suffolk County 
Registry of Deeds. 
Initial research by the Federal Reserve revealed that 51,223 such 
transactions had occurred between 1987 and 1990 (Munnell and Browne 
1991). To simplify the research task, some assumptions were made by the 
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Federal Reserve researchers. The local media had reported that the so-
called scam was particularly prevalent in minority areas, so the first 
assumption made by the Federal Reserve researchers was that Roxbury and 
Mattapan would be appropriate neighborhoods for their research. 
Subsequently, the researchers' decision identified a number of mortgage 
companies active in these areas. A second assumption was made by the 
Federal Reserve researchers that if mortgage companies are not making 
high-risk loans in these areas, they are probably not making them 
elsewhere. Therefore, mortgage companies offering standard interest 
rates were omitted from the search. Thus, the research task became more 
manageable. 
The next stage in the analysis by the Federal Reserve researchers 
was to define categories according to loan product terms and interest 
rates (Munnell and Browne 1991). Three such groups were defined: 
1) Group 1 lenders offering typically short-term maturities (up 
to five years) with high interest rates (18-percent or more). 
These loans were defined as "very burdensome"; 
2) Group 2 lenders offering more manageable products with 
maturities from five to twenty years and interest rates of 15- to 
18-percent. The Federal Reserve researchers felt the Group 2 
products offered flexibility and the opportunity to refinance if 
necessary; 
3) Group 3 lenders offering products that are long-term 
(typically five to twenty years) with some moderately high 
interest rates (15- to 18-percent), and some conventional interest 
rates (under 15-percent). 
4) Group 4 lenders offering conventional rates (under 15-percent) 
and conventional terms (typically up to twenty years). 
These groupings, as defined, are used in subsequent analyses of this 
research project for purposes of clarity and continuity. 
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The Federal Reserve researchers experienced difficulties, however, 
in examining the interest rates offered by mortgage companies as the 
Registry of Deeds records did not always include interest rates. 
Therefore, with companies that provided enough information to assume a 
pattern, such as Mortgage Funding Corporation, the Federal Reserve 
researchers categorized lenders according to that interest-rate pattern. 
Other companies, including Growth Mortgage Company and Chrysler First 
Eastern Financial Corporation, did not provide enough information to 
permit such assignments. Consequently, Growth Mortgage transactions 
were not included in the Federal Reserve analysis. It was also assumed 
by the Federal Reserve researchers that the companies were not high-rate 
lenders if their products were long term. This assumption applies to 
Chrysler First Eastern Financial Corp. 
Major Findings of the Federal Reserve Bank Study 
The following figures represent the number of loans and their 
geographic distribution. These figures were tabulated by the Federal 
Reserve researchers. 
According to the Federal Reserve study, 698 loans were made 
throughout the city between 1987 and 1990 at interest rates in excess of 
18-percent, most of which matured in less than five years (Table 4.3). 
An additional 1,630 loans were made with interest rates between 15- and 
18-percent, but with longer maturity periods. The remaining loans were 
made with interest rates under 15-percent, or were unidentified (Munnell 
and Browne 1991). 
While the number of high-interest loans in Roxbury and Mattapan 
total 207, this figure represents almost 30 percent of loans made 
throughout 
Suffolk County. 
Additionally, 
Dorchester has 
not been 
included in this 
total, making it 
impossible to 
determine if 
these products 
Table 4.3 SUMMARY OF MORTGAGE COMPANY LOANS BY RATE, 
1987-1990 
Total S1ffoll lo1hr7/ lest of 
htmst late Cmh Batton S1ffolt Coutr 
18% or .ore 698 207 491 
15% to 18% 1,630 298 1,332 
Under 15% 39,581 2,147 37,434 
Unidentified 
...Lill. ...LllQ. .Lill. 
Total 51,223 4,022 47,201 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank lle•o to Diet Syron fro• Alicia 
llunnell and Lynn Browne, Re: Second llortgages in Suffolk County: 
1987-90, Dated August 14, 1991. Figures are esti•ates based on 
data fro• Registry of Deeds and Banter & Trades•an. 
are specifically targeted to a geographic area or spread throughout the 
city using the data from the Federal Reserve study. Dorchester is 
located between Roxbury and Mattapan in the south-central area of the 
city. 
The 
Federal Reserve 
Bank study also 
categorized the 
lenders 
according to 
rates and terms. 
Table 4. 4 offers 
a summary of the 
number of 
transactions by 
lender group. 
Table 4.4 SUMMARY OF MORTGAGE LENDERS, ROXBURY/MATTAPAN 
AND SUFFOLK COUNTY 
lo1hr7/ 
Total lat ton 
GROUP 1 LllDlRS: High Rates, Generally Short !er• 
lest of 
Stffolt 
Total 762 179 583 
GROUP 2 LEIDERS: lloderately High Rates, Generally Long Tera 
Total 1,591 304 1,287 
GROUP 3 L[JDERS: Con•entional Rates, So•e lloderately High Rates 
Total 11983 394 1,589 
GROUP 4 LEIDERS: Conventional Rates 
Total 23,150 1,775 21,375 
Source: Federal Reserve Bant lle•o dated August 14, 1991 
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UNAC RESEARCH OF MORTGAGE COKPANY LENDING PRACTICES 
Data Sources and Hethodology 
The review of Federal Reserve Bank data are supplemented in this 
project by unpublished data collected by Union Neighborhood Assistance 
Corporation (UNAC). UNAC researchers took a different approach than the 
Federal Reserve researchers in identifying the high-rate lenders. 
UNAC researchers compiled a list of mortgage companies that 
offered products with high rates and short term maturities (Group 1 
lenders by the Federal Reserve definition), or moderately high rates and 
longer term maturities (Group 2 lenders by the same criteria). UNAC 
researchers were able to verify the interest rates through examination 
of the actual loan agreements signed by victimized homeowners. 
UNAC researchers brought the list of suspected mortgage companies 
to the Suffolk County Registry of Deeds. The Registry data base is 
capable of sorting by mortgage or loan grantee, that is, the institution 
or individual that holds a note on a property. This search identified 
all properties in Suffolk County that had a mortgage originated by the 
listed mortgage companies. 
UNAC researchers then conducted a search of each property address 
in the Registry records to review all legal claims held on that 
property. Worksheets were completed on each owner-occupied property 
(investment properties were not included), recording each entry made by 
the Registry Clerk advising on the status of the property from 1985 to 
1990, including the street address of the property, the neighborhood 
(Roxbury, Dorchester, Jamaica Plain, etc.), the owner's name, the date 
of the mortgage, the name of the mortgage company, code of the 
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transaction, including actions taken by the mortgage company or the city 
such as a tax taking, and the book and page number. Unfortunately, the 
Suffolk County Registry of Deeds records do not contain information on 
individual loan-to-value ratios, an important measure to determine an 
individual's ability to carry debt. The financial difficulties 
experienced by a household are revealed, in part, by the claims against 
the property. 
This method produced detailed information on over 660 properties 
throughout Suffolk County . Data from the worksheets were useful in 
supplementing the Federal Reserve Bank data to create a more detailed 
account of mortgage company transactions, particularly the high-rate 
lenders. 
UNAC and other community development organizations distributed a 
survey to the victimized homeowners in the spring of 1992. This action 
came in response to the state's Attorney General's request that UNAC 
provide details of the loan agreements made by hardlenders. Thirty-four 
surveys were made available to this author as a sample of the victimized 
homeowners. Information on contractors was included in the surveys, as 
well as income and household debt. 
ANALYSIS OF HORTGAGE COHPANY LENDING PATTERNS BY THIS AUTHOR 
Kethodology and Data Sources 
The UNAC worksheets were made available to this author by Bruce 
Marks, UNAC Executive Director. Because the worksheets listed the 
claims against the properties contained little analysis, the data could 
be reviewed without preconceived opinions regarding the status of the 
properties. This author first sorted the property addresses by 
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neighborhood. Each property was then categorized through the use of 
indicators to reflect the approximate risk to the property owner. 
Indicators included foreclosure notices, evidence of possession, and 
attachments or liens on property. A complete list of the groupings and 
indicators are presented below. This manner of organizing the data 
facilitated examination of the consequences to homeowners who contracted 
with high rate mortgage companies. The groups included: 
Group A: the original owner still owned the home, and there were 
no indicators of financial difficulties, such as an attachment or 
levy (lien) or tax lien against the property. 
Group B: the original owner still owned the home, but indicators 
of financial difficulties were evident. Indicators included 
attachment, levy (lien), tax lien, evidence of possession, order 
notice pf foreclosed mortgage, or notice petition of foreclosed 
tax . 
Group C: the property had changed hands either by foreclosure or 
by deed, following an order notice of foreclosed mortgage or a 
notice petition of foreclosed tax. 
Group D: the property had changed hands through sale by owner. 
The worksheets were also used to analyze the number of loans 
attached to each property . This was achieved by simply counting the 
mortgage companies and other lenders recorded for each property by the 
Registry of Deeds . 
This author experienced the same difficulty in determining the 
interest rates as the Federal Reserve researchers, as disclosure 
information was not required and little information was available from 
Registry records. The Registry of Deeds data on interest rates are 
supplemented by a review of court cases. 
Further Analysis of Mortgage Company Lending Patterns 
The Dorchester information was obtained from the UNAC worksheets. 
Two Group 1 mortgage companies (i.e. short maturities, high interest 
rates) have been particularly active in Roxbury, Dorchester and 
Mattapan. The companies are the Resource Companies (including all loans 
originated under the owner's various names) and Growth Mortgage. It is 
interesting to note that the Federal Reserve study did not include 
information on Growth Mortgage in any of its lender categories. 
Information that was available on this company from interviews by UNAC 
with affected homeowners indicated that the loans were balloon payment 
debts. Registry of Deeds records demonstrate that foreclosure notices 
were issued on many properties approximately one year after contracting 
the loan. Growth Mortgage was included in the Group 1 category of 
lenders as it appears to meet the defined criteria. 
The Resource Companies contracted a total of 336 loans in 
Dorchester, Roxbury and Mattapan. This figure is higher than the 
Federal Reserve Bank total of 232 because the Federal Reserve study 
covered the period from 1987 to 1990, while the UNAC research began in 
1985 and continued through 1990. Of the total 336 loans, Resource made 
192, or 57.1 percent of its loans in Dorchester, 38, or 11.3 percent in 
Roxbury, and 61, or 18.2 percent in Mattapan. Combined, this indicates 
that 86.6 percent of their lending activity throughout all of Suffolk 
County is distributed in the three neighborhoods analyzed in this 
research project. 
Growth Mortgage followed the lending pattern of the Resource 
Companies. A total of 98 loans were made throughout Suffolk County, 
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with 59, or 60.2 percent in Dorchester, 14, or 14.3 percent in Roxbury, 
and 9, or 9.2 percent in Mattapan. These figures suggest that 
Dorchester has experienced a higher proportion of Group 1 lender 
products than all other neighborhoods combined. 
For comparison, the authors of the Federal Reserve study tabulated 
the total number of loans made at less than 15-percent interest rates in 
Roxbury and Mattapan at 2,147, which represents 5.4 percent of the total 
throughout the city. The citywide average of all loans with traditional 
interest rates issued by mortgage companies represents over 77 percent. 
These figures suggest there is a real disparity in the lending practices 
of mortgage companies in different neighborhoods throughout the city. 
Number of Loans per Property 
The preceding figures have focused on the loan types and their 
neighborhood distribution. The following analysis concentrates on the 
properties and the number of loans attached to each. These data are 
compiled from the worksheets collected at UNAC. 
The sample size for analysis is 269 properties contracted with 
Group 1 lenders. The Federal Reserve study states the Suffolk County 
total is 762. The sample size is believed to be large enough to offer 
an accurate representation of Group 1 lender patterns. 
Typical banking industry standards provide that no more than two 
loans be attached to a property (Couture 1992). Generally, these would 
include the first mortgage and a second "equity" loan, a product that 
became popular during the 1980s. Equity loans have replaced fixed-rate 
home improvement loans, in that the interest rates generally vary, 
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usually one or two interest points over the prime interest rate. Banks 
adjust interest rates accordingly, reducing their risk (Couture 1992). 
Analysis of Table 4.5 NUMBER OF MORTGAGES ON PROPERTIES 
the sample Dorchester Roxbury !attapan Others 
lu•ber of Loans Attached to Properties 
1-2 3+ 1-2 3+ 1-2 3+ 1-2 3+ properties leads to 
the conclusion that 62 88 14 17 17 32 21 18 
the majority of Soiree: Property retoris, Saffoll Co11ty Registry of Deeds 
properties in 
Dorchester, Roxbury and Mattapan had over three loans attached to them 
(Table 4.5). Dorchester data alone produced 150 properties for 
analysis. Of these, 62 properties had one or two loans, and 88 had 
three or more, many of which had five or six loans, and two properties 
had eleven loans attached. Of the total properties throughout the 
county under contract with Group 1 lenders, 42.4 percent of the sample 
satisfied banking standards, with one or two mortgages, while 57.6 
percent exceeded (i.e. did not meet) the two-loan maximum industry 
standard. 
Interest Rates 
Determining the interest rates contracted ~th the Group 1 lenders 
was difficult. This industry had not been regulated, and mortgage 
companies were not required to make such information public. The 
property records of the Suffolk County Registry of Deeds offer some 
interest rate information. The follo~ng list, compiled through a 
review of the court case, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Resource 
Companies, offers an example of information that is available on the 
Resource Companies: 
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Property at 848 Huntington Ave., Boston. Amount financed: 
$6,751, annual interest rate: 39.45-percent, finance charge: 
$5,327.28, total payments due: $12,078.28 
Properties at 14 and 16 Abbott St., Dorchester. Amount financed: 
$30,800, annual interest rate: 34.09-percent, finance charge: 
$21,000, total payments due: $51,800 
Property at 9 Mt. Bowdoin Terrace, Dorchester. Amount financed: 
$30,800, annual interest rate: 34.09-percent, finance charge: 
$21,000, total payments due: $51,800 
Property at 18 Mascot St., Dorchester. Amount financed: $10,750, 
annual interest rate: 33.68-percent, finance charge: $7,242.68, 
total payments due: $17,992.68 
Property at 22 Rutland St., Boston. Amount financed: 
annual interest rate: 30.86-percent, finance charge: 
total payments due: $90,700.32 
Property at 40 Oak St., Hyde Park. Amount financed: 
annual interest rate: 42.09-percent, finance charge: 
total payments due: $12,580 
$56,082.16, 
$34,618.32, 
$6,830, 
$5,750, 
Property at 82 Rosewood St., Mattapan. Amount financed $18,100, 
annual interest rate: 31 . 77-percent, finance charge: $11,500, 
total payments due: $29,600 
Rates above 24-percent interest are usurious by industry standards 
(Couture 1992). The courts, as well, have found the rates to be 
exceptionally high. A summary of the court charges will be offered in 
the Chapter Five. 
The burden these loans impose on homeowners can be seen in the 
number of foreclosures that have occurred in Roxbury, Dorchester and 
Mattapan. Of 348 properties analyzed, 147, or 42.2 percent, were 
classified as Group C, the homeowners lost their homes either by 
foreclosure or deed. Another 97, or 27.9 percent, were classified as 
Group B, evidence of financial difficulties are evident and homeowners 
are at risk of losing their properties. Only 57 properties, or 16.4 
percent show no evidence of losing their homes (Group A), and 47, or 
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13.5 percent, have sold their homes (Group D). These data indicate the 
lending practices by mortgage companies have had a destabilizing effect 
on both the residents and the neighborhoods. 
Contractor Lending Practices 
The media covering of the second mortgage scam reported that 
contractors were often working with mortgage companies, and acted as 
loan originators in obtaining borrowers' signatures on the loan 
applications. This scenario was also offered in the public presentation 
by Diane Modica, Commissioner of Consumer Affairs and Licensing, City of 
Boston, in Mattapan on June 24, 1991 that this author attended. Very 
little information on contractors was found in the search through the 
Registry of Deeds records. 
Review of Registry records indicated a total of nine liens 
altogether were attached to properties in the 660 city-wide records 
reviewed. U.S. Window Corp. had four property liens, three of which 
were on properties located in Dorchester and one in Jamaica Plain. 
Vinyl Distributors of New England, Inc. had a lien against one property 
in Dorchester, as did NewPro, Inc., New England Brickmaster, Inc., 
Boston Building and Remodeling, Inc., and Elan Window Corp. 
Additional information on contractors was obtained from surveys 
completed by the victimized homeowners. A sample of thirty-four surveys 
were analyzed by this author. Eighteen surveys stated the second 
mortgages were taken for home repairs, sixteen surveys stated the second 
mortgages were taken for refinancing, debt consolidation, or such 
personal concerns as college tuition payments. 
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Survey responses indicated that half of the loans taken for home 
improvements resulted in unsatisfactory construction. Substandard 
conditions included leaking roofs, unsafe stairs and/or porches, heaters 
that were not working, and windows that were not air tight. Three 
respondents stated no improvements were completed, and the contractors 
had been paid for the work. The contractor companies against whom the 
complaints were made include U.S. Window Corp., Seacoast Industries, 
Inc., City Home Improvement, and Commonwealth Thermal Products. 
Violations of Truth-In-Lending Requirements 
The borrowers were questioned in the survey to determine if they 
had completed the loan application, or if the application was completed 
by the loan originator. Survey questions asked if the borrowers were 
informed of the conditions of the loan, including the interest rates, 
the length of the loan, the amount of closing costs, prepayment 
penalties, and the condition of balloon payments. Twenty-three of the 
thirty-four respondents answered these questions. Of the twenty-three 
respondents, twelve stated the loan applications were completed for 
them, while eleven borrowers completed the applications themselves. 
Only one respondent stated that the loan originator made a full 
disclosure of the conditions of the loan. In most cases, partial 
information was offered by the loan originator. The balloon payment at 
the end of the term was the most common piece of information not 
disclosed, followed by the amount of closing costs and pre-payment 
penalties. These data suggest that truth-in-lending laws are commonly 
violated by the loan originators. 
Household Income Information 
Household income levels were also stated in the surveys. Almost 
all of the households that were shown in the samples earned 
approximately $20,000 annually, suggesting that most were probably not 
in a position to successfully carry the debt incurred by contracting 
with the hardlenders. Three households earned between $30,000 and 
$40,000, and one household earned $75,000 annually. It has not been 
possible to confirm the individuals' credit history due to 
confidentiality laws. 
SUMMARY OF MORTGAGE COMPANY LENDING PRACTICES 
The objective of this chapter was to answer the major questions, 
What finance structure enables unregulated mortgage companies to 
operate; and, Who are the unregulated lenders in violation of 
established lending standards, and in what neighborhoods do they 
operate? Review of recent literature suggests that mortgage companies 
operate through a line of credit extended by major banks. Analysis of 
Suffolk County Registry of Deeds records described the lending practices 
of several mortgage companies offering very burdensome loan products in 
Roxbury, Dorchester and Mattapan. Information on the geographic 
distribution of mortgage companies was offered, indicating that mortgage 
companies operate in the specific neighborhoods redlined by banks. The 
number of loans, and the number of loans attached to properties were 
offered, indicating that many households incurred more debts than the 
banking industry standards suggest. What information is available on 
the terms and interest rates of the loans were offered as well, many of 
which do not satisfy banking industry standards. 
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Additional information was offered on some on the contractors that 
have provided home improvements at various levels of completion and 
satisfaction. Little information is available on this group from the 
data sources. Perhaps this question should be the focus of another 
research project using different data sources, such as the records of 
the Better Business Bureau or records maintained by the Office of the 
Commission of Licensing and Consumer Affairs. 
Responses to a sample of surveys completed by victimized 
homeowners suggest that violations of truth-in-lending laws was a common 
practice of the loan originators of Boston-based mortgage companies. 
This information, however, must be classified as anecdotal as the actual 
contracts signed by the borrowers were, in most cases, not made 
available. 
Chapter Five will review the efforts of the city of Boston and 
community groups to seek an equitable resolution to the unfair practices 
that have occurred in the city's minority neighborhoods. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
EFFORTS TO REMEDY THE 
"SECOND MORTGAGE SCAM" 
THE CITY RESPONDS TO THE "SCAM" 
Mortgage companies have met the demand for mortgage and home 
improvement financing, but have done so through the use of products that 
are unacceptable by banking industry standards. Community groups and 
activists brought the lending practices into the public awareness 
through the media, and the city of Boston has responded by attempting to 
seek an equitable resolution to the problem. 
One of the first and most effective remedies was to regulate 
mortgage companies in Massachusetts. The new regulation is 
Massachusetts General Law 255E that became effective on January 1, 1992. 
Under the provisions of the new law, mortgage companies must maintain a 
$100,000 net worth, while contractors are allowed to post a bond for 
this amount. Rate and term disclosure requirements are included, 
administered by the Massachusetts Banking Commission. Temporary 
licenses have been given to existing mortgage companies while they are 
investigated by the Banking Commission. At the time of this writing, 
thirty-three mortgage company licenses have been suspended for non-
compliance with the regulation. 
An incentive to the banking industry had been their ability to use 
loans originated by mortgage companies in minority neighborhoods as 
credit toward their CRA responsibilities. H.6021, An Act to Further 
Regulate Mortgage Lending, addressed this issue. The state CRA, Section 
14, Chapter 167, had allowed a bank that buys loans from a high interest 
lender or that provides financing to such a lender to receive positive 
CRA credit. The new law, H.6021, reduces this credit, and also caps 
interest rates. 
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The Attorney General imposed a moratorium on foreclosures by 
mortgage companies suspected of charging usurious interest rates. A 
reinvestment program is currently being developed to seek an equitable 
remedy for those homeowners affected by mortgage company lending 
practices. It is proposed that mortgage company loans be reviewed to 
determine the amount of the loan. Standard interest rates would be 
applied to that amount, the additional fees will be eliminated, and the 
borrower would be responsible for only the amount borrowed at standard 
rates. The details of this program, of course, are not yet available, 
as the Attorney General is currently collecting the data necessary to 
conduct such an analysis . 
Banks have come forward to provide needed funds to minority 
communities as well. Shawmut Bank has provided $5 million through the 
Massachusetts Housing Partnership to provide relief for victims of 
usurious interest rates and to create a pool for first-time buyers in 
minority neighborhoods. Baybank is expected to contribute several 
million dollars, and Fleet, which had extended a line of credit to the 
Resource Companies (the largest high rate lender in Roxbury, Mattapan 
and particularly Dorchester), has provided some $65 million to the city 
of Boston and a housing development program it administers. An 
additional $30 million has been provided by Fleet through its Bank of 
New England (BNE) purchase and prior commitments of BNE . 
Charges have been brought against the some of the hardlenders. 
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts brought charges against Home Repair, 
Inc., formally Seacoast Industries, Inc., and Robert Finestone for 
unfair and deceptive acts and practices in the sale of home improvement 
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services and in the provision of mortgage and other loan services in 
connection with financing home improvements services. These acts are in 
violation of the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act., G.L. Chapter 
93A, Section 2 (A). 
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts also brought charges against 
Resource Financial Group, Inc., Resource Lending, Inc., and Resource 
Services, Inc., all of 175 Derby St., Hingham, MA. The charges included 
unfair and deceptive acts and practices in violation of the 
Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act, and charges that the companies 
engaged in oppressive and unconscionable acts or practices. Such acts 
included charging full interest rates made to customers on funds held by 
Resource as "security funds or deposits" without providing any use or 
benefit to the customers for the use of these funds, and for charging 
such interest on the security funds as to be oppressive and 
unconscionable. Additional charges were brought against Resource 
Companies for violating truth-in-lending laws. Hopefully, these court 
cases will discourage mortgage companies from engaging in unfair lending 
practices in the future. 
Bank regulators have agreed to assert their authority and require 
banks to meet their CRA responsibilities as well. It is assumed that if 
the demand for home financing is met by traditional sources, the need 
for alternative financing will be reduced. 
CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSIONS 
CONCLUSIONS 
This author described the lending practices of banks and mortgage 
companies in the selected Boston neighborhoods of Roxbury, Dorchester 
and Mattapan. Because city officials and community groups are currently 
seeking remedies to solve the problems of usurious lending practices by 
unregulated mortgage companies, this research project cannot address all 
the issues involved with the lending structure in place in 
Massachusetts. Nonetheless, these findings provide a base-line of 
information to assist other researchers in subsequent investigations. 
The evidence presented in this report indicates that the regulated 
banking industry has not met the needs of low- and moderate-income 
neighborhoods in Boston as required by the CRA. Even with adjustments 
for wealth and income, it is evident that neighborhoods with a majority 
of black residents have been redlined by the banking industry. The 
resulting credit crunch in Roxbury, Dorchester and Mattapan has created 
a demand that was met by unregulated mortgage companies. 
No attempt was made by this researcher to determine if mortgage 
company products were marketed specifically to residents in the subject 
neighborhoods. However, it seems more than coincidence that the 
usurious mortgage companies would market the highest proportion of their 
products in precisely the same neighborhoods that the banks have 
redlined. 'Whether by coincidence or design, the equity lending 
practices of these mortgage companies were found to adversely affect 
disproportionate numbers of poor black residents in Roxbury, Dorchester 
and Mattapan. 
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The author determined that subject mortgage companies operated 
through financial relationships with banks. Some, particularly the 
Resource Companies funded by Fleet Bank, packaged loan products that 
were very burdensome to borrowers. A result of this practice was often 
foreclosure. 
This practice has a destabilizing effect, and promotes the 
deterioration of the housing stock within neighborhoods. The 
predictable pattern of deterioration established by the Urban League 
suggests that Roxbury, Dorchester and Mattapan are currently in the 
third or fourth stage of housing transition. That is, there is evidence 
of property speculation and exploitation (Stage 3), and deterioration of 
market conditions and disinvestment by both financial institutions and 
property owners who stop maintaining the property (Stage 4). Evidence 
of the final stage, property abandonment, can already be seen in certain 
parts of Roxbury. 
Other findings described in this study are as follows: 
• Attempts have been made by Boston city officials and local 
community groups to seek a resolution to the financing problem. A 
multi-million dollar fund has been established by the 
Fleet/Norstar Group, Shawmut Bank and Baybank for the purposes of 
home purchases and home repair financing in Roxbury, Dorchester 
and Mattapan. 
• A moratorium on foreclosures has been put in place by the 
Attorney General to provide a period of time to review the loan 
contracts. Community groups are advocating that traditional terms 
and interest rates be applied to these loans, reducing the burden 
to the borrowers. 
• Mortgage companies became regulated in Massachusetts on January 
1, 1992. Temporary licenses have been issued to existing mortgage 
companies while the Massachusetts Banking Commission investigates 
the solvency and business practices of the mortgage companies. At 
the time of this writing, thirty-three companies have had their 
licenses suspended because they have not met the new regulations. 
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• Finally, those individuals who have abused the unregulated 
environment and violated consumer protection laws have had 
complaints charged against them by the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts. Several individuals have been convicted and are 
currently serving jail sentences. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
These findings show that Boston's major banks have not met the 
needs of low- and moderate-income residents as required by the Community 
Reinvestment Act. The economic recession of the early 1990s makes it 
doubtful that this situation will change in the near future without 
strict enforcement by bank regulators. Additionally, the current 
structure of the banking industry, and the recent expansion of wholesale 
mortgage banks that purchase loans originated by mortgage companies 
provides evidence that mortgage company activities will continue to grow 
in the future. If regulated banks continue to place their resources 
into loan purchases rather than branch offices, community needs will 
likely remain unmet. The current status of the industry policing itself 
does not appear to be effective. Perhaps it is time to place CRA 
enforcement requirements beyond the banking industry. 
The current structure of the banking industry allows abuse which 
may well continue in the future. Mortgage companies do not replenish 
their funds through deposits in the same manner as banks. Mortgage 
companies are able to offer loans through a line of credit they maintain 
with banks. Home loans originated by mortgage companies are sold back 
to banks that, in turn, sell many of the mortgages in the secondary 
mortgage market. The banks purchasing these mortgages do not review all 
applications in the same manner they would if they originated the loans. 
Bank examiners select a few loans as a sample for review, but complete 
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information on interest rates, especially over 18-percent, has not 
always been provided by the mortgage company (Marantz 1991). Those 
mortgages sold in the secondary mortgage market that default are insured 
by the federal government . Under this structure, banks enjoy an 
insulated position. They have not been held responsible for usurious 
lending practices because the mortgage companies originated the loans. 
Loans sold in the secondary mortgage market and subsequently default are 
insured by the federal government. It appears that the banks have 
little to lose in this situation. 
In the interests of economic stability, it is desirable to 
financially support the banking industry against major losses. Yet this 
author believes that the taxpayer has a right to expect banks to promote 
industry standards in return for the safety net the federal government 
provides the banking industry. This includes meeting the obligations of 
the Community Reinvestment Act to provide products and services to low-
and moderate-income households, as well as reviewing the loan 
applications originated by mortgage companies. 
If banks were to be held culpable for the destabilizing effect 
that, in fact, they are promoting by financially supporting the 
hardlenders, it seems likely they would review the loan contracts more 
thoroughly as they purchase the loans from mortgage companies. Banks 
could simply refuse to purchase questionable mortgage company loans. 
Such efforts would serve to promote industry standards and prevent 
usurious interest rates and the subsequent foreclosures that result from 
very burdensome debts. These efforts might serve to reduce the number 
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of future foreclosures and might add a few jobs to the local economy as 
well. 
A few of the mortgage companies operating in Roxbury, Dorchester 
and Kattapan have abused the unregulated environment. Recent 
legislation, however, serves to provide safeguards for borrowers in the 
future. Perhaps Congress should consider regulating mortgage companies 
operating throughout the United States to prevent future abuse of the 
unregulated environment. 
As of this writing, the residents of Roxbury, Dorchester and 
Kattapan are still without a steady supply of funds for the purchase and 
improvement of homes. As previously mentioned, Shawmut Bank, Baybank 
and Fleet/Norstar Group have recently established a multi-million dollar 
fund to meet the neighborhood needs. This seems to be a short-term 
solution, however. One wonders if the fund will be replenished when the 
original monies are disbursed, or if the neighborhoods will be left to 
deteriorate once again. The future stability of the area requires a 
steady flow of capital. 
F~~ER~EARCH 
This investigation stimulates questions for future research. For 
example, many of the residents of Roxbury, Dorchester and Kattapan are 
low-income households. For some, the costs of homeownership might be 
too burdensome to establish homeownership as a goal. But, for those 
homeowners who purchased their homes twenty or thirty years ago, and 
have carefully managed their resources to maintain their property, what 
programs need to be made available and/or expanded to these individuals? 
Programs for consideration might include reverse equity plans, or low-
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interest home improvement loans which can provide needed capital to 
homeowners with less risk of foreclosure. 
Finally, it would be of interest to learn the extent to which 
victimized homeowners were helped by state or federal programs to enable 
them to become homeowners in the first place. Historically, such home 
purchase programs have been established without concern for continuing 
maintenance responsibilities. Information about the needs of assisted 
households could lead to recommendations for ongoing support for low-
and moderate-income homebuyers/owners. Within this context, it would 
also be of interest to learn the costs associated with a long-term 
government commitment to low- and moderate-income homeowners. It would 
be useful to compare the costs of such support programs against the 
costs to the taxpayer for mortgages in default because of very 
burdensome debts. While these questions are beyond the scope of this 
research, determining the answers might help to solve some of the 
problems of housing in Boston. 
GLOSSARY 
Hardlenders: A colloquialism used by the Boston media and community 
organizers to refer to the mortgage companies 
packaging loan products that are typically short-term, 
very high interest rate debts. The term 
differentiates these lenders from other unregulated 
mortgage companies whose products are less burdensome 
to borrowers. 
Regulated Banks: This term refers to financial institutions that are 
regulated by one or more of the four regulatory 
agencies, the Federal Reserve, the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the Federal Home 
Loan Bank Board (FHLBB). Lenders under the 
jurisdiction of these agencies include all banks, 
savings and loans, and credit unions that provide home 
mortgage loans. 
Unregulated Hortgage Companies: 
Refers to mortgage companies operating in an 
unregulated environment. Most such mortgage companies 
offer loans to borrowers through a line of credit 
established with regulated banks. Although a few 
unregulated mortgage companies are large enough to 
remain independent of banks and sell their loans 
directly into the secondary mortgage market, most rely 
on the financial relationship with banks. 
Usurious Interest Rates: 
Are defined as interest rates in excess of 24-percent 
annually. 
Usurious Lenders: Are those lenders charging interest rates in excess of 
24-percent annually. 
Usury: The act or practice of lending money at an exorbitant 
or illegal rate of interest. 
61 
REFERENCES 
Books 
Achtenberg, Emily Paradise and Peter Marcuse, "The Causes of the Housing 
Problem", Critical Perspectives on Housing, ed Bratt, et al, Temple 
University Press, 1986 
Apgar, William C., Denise DiPasquale, Jean Cummings, and Nancy McArdle, 
The State of the Nation's Housing 1991, Joint Center for Housing Studies 
at Harvard University 
Arrow Street Map Atlas of Metropolitan Boston MA 1978 
Citizens Commission on Civil Rights "The Federal Government and Equal 
Housing Opportunity: A Continuing Failure" Critical Perspectives on 
Housing ed. Bratt et al 1986 
Commonwealth of MA v. Resource Financial Group, Inc., Resource Lending, 
Inc., Resource Services, Inc. West Publications 
Commonwealth of MA v. Home Repair, Inc., formally Seacoast Industries, 
West Publications 
Finn, Charles Mortgage Lending in Boston's Neighborhoods, 1981-1987: A 
Study of Bank Credit and Boston's Housing, December, 1989 
Florida, Richard, "Overview", Housing and the New Financial Markets 1986 
Listokin, David and Stephen Casey, Mortgage Lending & Race: Conceptual 
and Analytical Perspectives of the Urban Financing Problem 1980 
McAfee, Kathy "Socialism and the Housing Movement: Lessons from Boston" 
Critical Perspectives on Housing ed Bratt et al 1986 
Meyerson, Ann "Housing Abandonment: The Role of Institutional Mortgage 
Lenders" Critical Perspectives on Housing ed Bratt et al 1986 
Meyerson, Ann "Deregulation and the Restructuring of the Housing Finance 
System" Critical Perspectives on Housing ed Bratt et al 1986 
Olson, David A., "Mortgage Markets in the Year 2000, Overview", Journal 
of Housing Research, Vol. 1, Issue 1, 1990 
Rose, Peter and Richard L. Haney Jr., "The Players in the Primary 
Mortgage Market", Journal of Housing Research, Vol. 1, Issue 1, 1990 
Stone, Michael "Housing and the Dynamics of U.S. Capitalism" Critical 
Perspectives on Housing ed Bratt et al 1986 
62 
Periodicals 
American Banker, "Top Numbers 1989 Update" 1989 p64 
Canellos, Peter, "Probe Asked of Fleet Finance's Practices", Boston 
Globe, June 9, 1991 
Bradbury, Katharine, et al, "Geographic Patterns of Mortgage Lending in 
Boston, 1982-1987", New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of 
Boston, Sept.-Oct. 1989 
Federal Reserve Board, Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Home Loan 
Bank Board, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, "Joint News Release 
on CRA" March 12, 1989 
Marantz, Steve, "Roles in Mortgage Schemes Scrutinized", Boston Globe, 
May 31, 1991 
Interviews 
Couture, Paul, Director of Major Assets, FDIC, telephone interview by 
author April 1992 
Marks, Bruce, Executive Director, Union Neighborhood Assistance Corp., 
Local 26, Hotel and Restaurant Workers, Boston MA, several interviews by 
author in June, July, and December 1991, and January through April, 1992 
Massachusetts Banking Commission, Legal Department, telephone interview 
by author, April, 1992 
Walker, Richard, Director of Community Relations, Federal Reserve Bank 
of Boston, telephone interview by author, February 1992 
Others 
Case, Karl "Housing Finance in Boom and Post-Boom Markets", The Banking 
Crises and the Future of Housing, A Fannie Mae University Colloquium 
Series, Oct. 17, 1991 
Ferguson, Thomas "Housing and the Internationalization of the U.S. 
Banking Industry", The Banking Crises and the Future of Housing, A 
Fannie Mae University Colloquium Series, November 14, 1991 
Munnell, Alicia and Lynne Browne, Memorandum to Dick Srron, Federal 
Reserve Bank of Boston, August 14, 1991 
Suffolk County Registry of Deeds records for properties in Roxbury, 
Dorchester and Mattapan, 1985-1990 
63 
